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A government can use several mechanisms to induce firms to behave in the way it 
desires. It can set a subsidy rate for the desired activity, it can require that a set quantity 
of the activity be engaged in, or it can set a budget, adjusting either the subsidy rate or the 
quantity level to meet the budget. We demonstrate that uncertainty can make a budget 
policy more efficient than either a fixed subsidy rate or a fixed quantity. We also show 
that the optimal budget declines with a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of 
marginal costs. 
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1. Introduction 
Much regulation aims to control externalities in the presence of uncertainty.  A 
large and influential literature considers how price and quantity mechanisms, and hybrid 
combinations of the two, perform.
1  This paper analyses a third option, budget regulation, 
in which firms choose quantity in response to a price government sets so that total 
spending by government on the program (or total revenue it collects) meets a specified 
target. We shall see that such a policy can be more efficient than both regulation by price 
or regulation by quantity. 
Budget constraints are used by firms to manage divisions, departments and even 
some individual contracts.  For example, firms often impose a capital budget that requires 
managers to prioritize among a wide range of projects with apparently attractive rates of 
return.  University faculty have found that, in a crunch, budgets rather than previously 
allocated positions dominate hiring opportunities. Universities and colleges commonly 
set a budget for financial aid, adjusting the grant amount to some students to meet the 
budget.  Weitzman, in his seminal 1974 paper, questions the emphasis and preference by 
economists for price instruments, given the apparent ubiquity in industry of quantity 
instruments.  The same query can be posed for budget instruments relative to both price 
and quantity. 
One application of our analysis concerns regulation of greenhouse emissions.  
While a simple cap-and-trade system is the archetypal incentive-based quantity 
regulation, the language of the proposed legislation would instead implement a form of 
cap-and-trade that is effectively price regulation or budget regulation. For example, in the 
                                                           
1 Weitzman (1974), Weitzman (1978) and Roberts and Spence (1976) established the basic structure of the 
models in this literature.  The dynamic issues, and more complex modeling date from Pizer (1999) and 
Pizer (2002).  A recent survey is Hepburn (2006).  
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United States, the Lieberman-Warner bill would establish a Carbon Market Efficiency 
Board to determine when the trading program of permits imposes “excessive net costs”
2 
on the economy, in which case it could implement a series of cost relief measures, 
including expanding “the total quantity of emission allowances made available to all 
covered facilities at any given time...”
3  These provisions can be (loosely) interpreted to 
mean that the regulation would adjust so that the market value of permits meets a fixed 
value.   Another proposed bill, the Waxman-Markey bill, contains procedures that allow a 
“reserve allowance fund” to be auctioned when permit prices reach a specified level.  
Depending on demand, either quantity or price regulation holds in the short run.
 4  
All three policies we consider are found in practice, even in such limited areas as 
the promotion of renewable fuels. In the United States, the Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS) program uses quantity regulation, requiring electricity distribution 
companies to procure 10–15% of their electricity from renewable facilities.  A market 
exists for renewable energy credits that can satisfy all or part of RPS requirements.  An 
example of regulation by price lies in a US program which allows investor-owned 
utilities to earn a tax credit for investing in generating plants that use renewable fuels.  
This is a so-called “tax expenditure” program, which is analytically equivalent to price 
regulation.  A budget regulation program for the same purpose exists for public and rural 
electric cooperatives which build plants using renewable fuels: the Department of Energy 
receives an annual appropriation to subsidize these activities.  The subsidy rate varies by 
                                                           
2 Lieberman-Warner, Section 2602 (b)(3)(iv). 
3 Lieberman-Warner, Section 2604 (a) (1) (F).  The legislation specifies that the additional permits be 
“borrowed” from future years’ allocations, so that over a fifty year period quantity is the ultimate 
constraint.  The Waxman-Markey reserve allocation is also borrowed from future allocations. 
4 The hybrid quantity/price provisions as well as other permit-price reducing mechanisms can, if 
implemented properly, substantially reduce the cost of the program.  See, e.g., Jacoby and Ellerman (2004), 
Newell, Pizer and Zhang (2005), Fell, MacKenzie and Pizer (2008), Fell and Morgenstern (2009), the 
National Commission on Energy Policy (2009).  
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year, depending on demand, so that total annual spending on the program remains within 
budget.
5   
This paper examines conditions under which budget regulation is more efficient 
than price and quantity regulation. We think that the analysis applies beyond regulation 
(for example, we might think of government policies to promote innovation, to encourage 
road construction, to promote health insurance, and so on.) We therefore shall speak of a 
budget policy rather than of budget regulation. But to be concrete, we shall illustrate with 
a discussion of a government inducing firms to abate emissions. 
We find that a budget policy dominates a policy with a fixed subsidy rate or a 
fixed aggregate activity level if the uncertainty is mild, and if the marginal cost curve is 
neither too flat nor too steep compared to the marginal benefit curve.  Under the 
simplified assumptions of our model, a budget policy is always more efficient than at 
least one of the other alternatives, if not both.  In contrast to Weitzman’s (1974) results 
on the relative efficiency of price and quantity policies, the extent of uncertainty is 
critical to determining when a budget policy is best.  Furthermore, we show that, unlike 
the optimal subsidy or the optimal quantity under a price or quantity policy, the optimal 
budget for a budget policy declines when uncertainty increases.
6  Lastly, we establish 
conditions where a budget policy is both the efficient regulatory strategy and costs 
government less than the expected cost of an optimal tax-expenditure program.  
                                                           
5 see EIA (2008).  Claims are prioritized into several categories.  Reimbursement rates vary by category, 
and all are subject to pro rata diminution if claims exceed the budget.  Of course, this system is only 
efficient if the categories separate projects according to marginal productivity.  While there is arguably a 
correlation – the more novel projects receive a higher reimbursement rate – a case can be made that the 
categories are more commensurate with marginal political productivity than economic.  
6 Kolstad (1996) finds that the extent of uncertainty changes the optimality of price and quantity 
instruments in a dynamic setting with learning.  
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The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section gives additional background 
about the budget instrument in the context of environmental and energy regulation.  
Section 3 presents the formal model and compares the three policies. Section 4 turns to 
optimal budget policy, and show how the size of the optimal budget varies with 
uncertainty.  The paper concludes in section 5. 
 
2. Background 
  A budget policy can work in several ways.  In all cases, the government first sets 
a budget.  Next, nature resolves the uncertainty over costs.  Government can then follow 
a cap-and-trade approach, choosing a cap on emissions and either distributing the permits 
and establishing a market for trades or holding an auction.
7  The cap is chosen so that the 
cap times the permit price equals the budget.  Alternatively, the government can set a 
subsidy such that the combined activity level for all covered entities results in claims that 
exhaust the budget.   
In Weitzman’s model and the subsequent related literature, uncertainty is 
modelled as a shock to marginal cost.  The regulator must know both the expected 
marginal cost and expected marginal benefits curve to determine the optimal price or 
optimal quantity.  The “incentive” feature of the policies allows cost minimization among 
heterogeneous polluters, but still requires the regulator to know something about the 
aggregate emissions technology.  Budget regulation starts from the same premise, but 
requires in addition that government can adjust its subsidy rate to meet the budget 
constraint. One way for government to do this is to observe the random shock to costs 
                                                           
7 At this point one might wonder why the agency doesn’t set a cap to maximize welfare; the first-best 
solution.  The assumption here, as with other agency studies, is that the incentives of the agency require 
prior action by the polity, as the agency prefers to spend its entire budget, whatever that may be.  
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contemporaneously with firms.
8  A plausible scenario that would conform to this 
requirement arises when the cost shock is largely due to macroeconomic conditions, as is 
argued by Philibert (2008; p. 18) for greenhouse gas emissions. Alternatively, 
government may observe spending on subsidies for a sample of firms or time, and use a 
tatonnement process to adjust the subsidy rate to conform to its budget constraint. 
  Price, quantity, and budget policies all require that the instrument be set in the 
presence of uncertainty and that flexibility is maintained for the other targets.  For a price 
policy, both quantity and the government’s tax receipts or spending under the policy– the 
budget – will depend on the resolution of uncertainty and cannot be fixed in advance.  
For example, the Car Allowance Rebate System (popularly known as “cash for 
clunkers”), a federal price policy program that offers consumers a fixed subsidy for 
buying a car with improved fuel efficiency, was, less than two weeks into the program in 
July 2009, some two billion dollars over its initial appropriation, at which time the 
program was saved by additional legislative action.
9  For a quantity policy, neither the 
price nor the budget is fixed.  While much of the discussion surrounding climate 
regulation in the United States has focused on the potential for permit price spikes in a 
cap-and-trade system, the uncertainty is two-sided.   Permit prices in the sulfur-dioxide 
cap-and-trade market during its first decade were far below projections.
10    
  For budget regulation, we assume, consistent with both experience and political 
economy theory, that the agency will always spend its entire budget, whether or not the 
                                                           
8 More generally, the regulator needs to observe the component of the shock that pertains to firms at the 
margin. 
9  See, e.g., http://blogs.edmunds.com/strategies/2009/08/cash-for-clunkers-senate-approves-2-billion-in-
extra-funding.html (accessed August 19, 2009). 
10  See Tatsutani and Pizer (2008).  
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action is consistent with economic efficiency ex post.
11  Thus, budgets here bind from 
both above and below, and neither the quantity nor the per-unit price will be known at the 
time that the budget is set.   
We abstract from important concerns such as the cost to the government of 
implementing the different approaches ex ante and of enforcing or monitoring 
performance ex post.
12   In our discussion of a budget policy, we consider only spending 
by the government, ignoring the costs to firms of abating pollution.
13   Ours is a partial 
equilibrium analysis.  Moreover, each of the instruments can be structured to impose 
costs on either (or both) the public or private sector, and this choice has important 
implications for efficiency which we do not consider here.
14   Within this context we can 
pose Weitzman’s question: notwithstanding imperfections in all three instruments, which 
will yield the best expected efficiency outcome?  
 
3. Modelling Price, Quantity and Budget Instruments 
3.1 Subsidy policy and quantity policy 
The exposition below is made simpler by considering a subsidy for abatement 
rather than a tax on emissions (where emissions can be reduced by abatement), though of 
                                                           
11 See, e.g., Niskanen (1974), Romer and Rosenthal (1979). 
12  An excellent discussion of management issues involved in the “tax expenditure” (price) versus “direct 
expenditure” (generally budget) is contained in Weisbach and Nussim (2004). Also omitted from our 
discussion are political feasibility and whether the regulatory instruments fruitfully align with cultural and 
altruistic incentives.  An excellent overview and discussion of the importance and interrelationship of these 
issues for price and quantity regulation of the environment is contained in Hepburn (2006). 
13 The government may wish to ignore abatement costs to the firm because they are difficult to measure or 
to verify. A policy which depended on such unverifiable measures might lack credibility and could induce 
much litigation. 
14 Overviews of these and a host of other issues that are relevant for instrument choice in environmental 
regulation are contained in Cropper and Oates (1992), Goulder, Parry, Williams and Burtraw (1999) and 
Goulder and Parry (2008).  Another limitation of our analysis is its emphasis on static efficiency.  For 
dynamic efficiency, the impact of instruments on incentives to innovate are critical.  Fischer and Newell 
(2008) analyze a broad array of environmental policy instruments from this perspective.   
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course one is equivalent to the other. So our statements about a subsidy policy can also be 
interpreted as a tax or a price policy.  
Our analysis starts with the key result from Weitzman (1974): when marginal 
costs and marginal benefits are relatively unresponsive to changes in quantity, a subsidy 
policy is more efficient than a quantity policy.
15  Alternatively, when marginal costs and 
marginal benefits are sensitive to the quantity level, a quantity policy can dominate a 
subsidy policy.  Intuitively, flat marginal benefits imply a constant benefit per unit, 
allowing a tax or subsidy to correct the externality. In contrast, steep marginal benefits 
imply a dangerous threshold that should be avoided—a threshold that is efficiently 
enforced by a quantity control. 
The result is illustrated in Figure 1.  Shocks to marginal costs are represented by 
the random variable θ; f(θ) is the symmetric distribution over θ with mean zero.  We 
suppose that the marginal benefit curve intersects the expected marginal cost curve at the 
point (q, p) = (1, 1), and for each realization of θ, the marginal cost curve takes the 
form:
16
 MC(θ) = {(p, q)| p = q – θ}. 
 Line MC(0) depicts expected marginal cost, the horizontal line P0 shows the optimal 
subsidy rate, and the vertical line Q0 shows the optimal quantity. Point E lies at the 
intersection of P0, Q0, and MC(0), and  is the expected outcome under both the subsidy 
                                                           
15 Weitzman and the subsequent authors who address this issue obtain results for the case where both 
marginal costs and marginal benefits are linear and homothetic in θ.  These assumptions are employed in 
this paper as well. 
16  The slope restrictions can be relaxed. Let the expected marginal cost curve be any vector through the 
origin with positive slope and suppose the marginal benefit curve intersects the expected marginal cost 
curve at some point (po, qo). By rescaling the coordinates so that x = q/qo and y = p/po 
we obtain the identical structure and  results as in section 4. 
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and quantity policy.
17  Line MC(θ) is an additional marginal cost curve for a non-zero 
realization of θ, point X is the outcome for a given θ under a quantity policy, and Z is the 
outcome under a subsidy policy.  
Figure 1 shows a marginal benefit line MB* which has identical curvature to the 
marginal cost lines (or a slope of -1).  Triangle EAX, the efficiency loss under the 
quantity policy, is congruent to triangle AZU, the loss under the fixed subsidy.  Thus, a 
subsidy policy and a quantity policy generate identical efficiency losses.  For marginal 
benefit lines that are steeper than MB*, efficiency losses under the quantity policy are 
smaller than under the subsidy policy; the opposite holds for marginal benefit curves that 
are flatter than MB*.  
Because uncertainty enters as a shock to the marginal cost curve, changing the 
value of θ yields proportionate increases or decreases in the welfare loss triangles.  Thus, 
the relative efficiency of the two policies is maintained for all non-zero values of θ, and, 
in consequence, for any distribution f(θ).  This establishes Weitzman’s general result that 
when marginal benefits exhibit relatively less curvature than marginal costs, regulation 
by price is more efficient than regulation by quantity, and vice versa.  
 
3.2 Budget policy 
Consider next the budget policy.  As the expected cost to the government under 
the optimal subsidy policy is p0q0, we let this be the budget allocated to the bureau. The 
bureau can meet the budget constraint by choosing a per-unit subsidy so that profit-
maximizing firms will respond to p ^    with a quantity  q ^    such that the allocated budget is 
                                                           
17 See Weitzman (1974).  His formulation is more general than is presented here. We employ the 
simplification in order to model the more complex, non-linear budget policy.  
 -  10  - 
exhausted. Or it can set a cap q ^    on abatement such that the subsidy rate, p ^   ,  which induces 
such abatement results in the budgeted spending on subsidies:  
 p ^   q ^     = poqo = 1 
and: 
 p ^     =  q ^     - θ. 
 
The budget constraint, shown in Figure 1, is the hyperbola B
 = {(q, p)| pq = 1}. 
For θ = 0, subsidy, quantity, and budget policies yield the identical result.  For other 
values of θ, the outcome under the budget policy lies at the intersection of the associated 
marginal cost curve and curve B (for example, point Y in Figure 1).  
Because the budget constraint is non-linear, no single marginal benefit line will 
equate efficiency losses among the policies for all values of θ.  However, there exists an 
indifference curve IP such that when the optimal outcome lies on IP (that is, MB and 
MC(θ) intersect at a point on IP), efficiency losses are identical under subsidy and budget 
policies.    If the optimal outcome would lie between IP and P0, subsidy policy is more 
efficient than budget policy; for first-best optimal outcomes between IP and B, budget 
policy is more efficient.  Curve IQ is defined similarly.  
IP and IQ are defined as follows: (the derivation is contained in the Appendix, 
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2): 
IQ = {(q, p)| (q – ½)(q + p - 1) = ½} 
IP = {(q, p)| (p – ½)(q + p – 1) = ½} 
Both intersect the point E = (1,1).  IQ is asymptotic to the line p + q = 1 as θ becomes 
small, and approaches the line q = ½ for large values of θ.  IP is left-asymptotic to the line 
p + q = 1, and right asymptotic to the line p = ½.   (See Figure 2.)  
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3.3 Comparing policies 
Given the characterization of the curves IP and IQ, we can investigate the relative 
efficiencies of the three policies. We first consider the case where subsidy and quantity 
policies are equally efficient. 
Proposition 1: Suppose the marginal benefit curve is such that expected social welfare is 
the same under the optimal subsidy rate and the optimal quantity. If the budget under the 
budget policy equals expected spending by government under the subsidy policy, then for 
every non-zero value of θ, the budget policy dominates both the subsidy policy and the 
quantity policy. Under these conditions, when the marginal cost curve is subject to any 
uncertainty, the budget policy dominates both the subsidy policy and the quantity 
policy.
18  
As Figure 2 shows, the optimal outcome for each θ, which lies on MB*, is always 
closer to B than to either PO or QO.  Compare first a  budget policy to a subsidy policy. 
For negative shocks to the marginal cost of abatement (negative values of θ), MB* lies 
beneath B, whereas IP is in between B and PO.  In these cases, both a subsidy policy and a 
budget policy result in too much abatement (excess q). But a budget policy moderates the 
excess in part by responding to low costs with a reduced subsidy rate and an increased 
quantity; a subsidy policy continues to subsidize at an excessively high rate relative to 
cost.  For positive shocks, MB* lies between IP and B.  Note that IP is asymptotic to the 
line p+q = 1, which is parallel to MB*, so the two will never intersect for positive values 
of θ.  In this range a budget policy results in too much abatement and a subsidy policy in 
too little, but the budget policy is more efficient.  
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Comparing the budget and quantity instruments, Figure 2 shows a symmetric 
situation to the subsidy versus budget case.  For positive cost shocks, both budget and 
quantity policies result in too much abatement, but less so in the budget case: MB* is 
always beneath IQ and also beneath B.  For negative shocks, the asymptotes for IQ again 
ensure that IQ and MB* cannot intersect.  Here the quantity policy results in too little 
abatement, while firms abate too much under the budget policy. The budget policy, 
however, is more efficient than the quantity policy.  
Under uncertainty, the budget policy offers an intermediate outcome between the 
other policies. It also offers an intermediate expected efficiency outcome: 
Proposition 2: Suppose the marginal benefit curve makes a subsidy policy dominate a 
quantity policy. Then the budget policy also dominates a quantity policy. When a 
quantity policy dominates a subsidy policy, a budget policy also dominates a subsidy 
policy.  
Either a subsidy or quantity policy can dominate a budget policy.  When marginal 
benefits are perfectly inelastic, the marginal benefit curve will coincide with the optimal 
quantity constraint (line Q0) for every marginal cost outcome.  In this case, a quantity 
policy is the first-best outcome for all values of θ: marginal cost and marginal benefits 
are equated and no efficiency loss occurs.  Similarly, when marginal benefits are 
perfectly elastic, the marginal benefit line coincides with the optimal subsidy constraint, 
line P0, and a fixed subsidy rate is efficient.  In these extreme cases, budget policy cannot 
be the best policy.  Furthermore, a budget policy continues to be worse when the 
marginal benefit line is reasonably steep (quantity policy dominates) or reasonably flat 
(subsidy policy dominates),. But Proposition 2 implies that the budget policy can never 
                                                                                                                                                                             
18 Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the different policies yield interior solutions for the range of  
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be the worst policy of the three. The precise conditions are stated in Proposition 3: 
Proposition 3: For all marginal benefit curves with slopes {m|m ≤ -3}, a quantity policy 
dominates a budget policy. For all marginal benefit curves with slopes {m| m ≥ -1/3}, a 
subsidy policy dominates a budget policy. 
Indeed, the only marginal benefit line for which budget policy is always superior, 
irrespective of the distribution of θ, is the case of MB* discussed in Proposition 1.  When  
the marginal benefit curve is close to, but not identical with, MB*, the ordering among 
the top two policies can, in principle, switch. 
Figure 3 illustrates the issue. As before, MB* is tangent to curve B at point E, 
making the budget policy best. Now consider MB1, which is slightly steeper than MB*, 
so that its slope is less than -1 but greater than -3.  Budget policy will continue to 
dominate quantity policy for positive cost shocks, as MB1 always lies beneath IQ.  But, 
for sufficiently negative shocks to the marginal cost of abatement, line MB1 must 
eventually intersect IQ., say, for θ = θL.  At θL, the budget and quantity policies yield 
identical efficiency losses. For θ > θL, the budget policy dominates; for θ< θL the quantity 
policy dominates.  In this case, marginal benefits of abatement are so low that the excess 
abatement under budget policy is inefficient relative to the shortfall in abatement induced 
by a quantity policy. 
Which policy yields a smaller expected efficiency loss depends on the distribution 
of θ.  If uncertainty is sufficiently limited – for example, if θL is a lower bound for the 
feasible values of θ - then the budget policy dominates.  However, there exist 
distributions of θ which, notwithstanding symmetry requirements, give sufficient weight 
to very low values of θ so that the quantity policy is better.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
feasible marginal costs.   
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The reverse pattern holds for the relative attractiveness of the subsidy policy and 
the budget policy, illustrated in Figure 4. Here, problems for budget policy occur when 
there is a positive shock to cost.  The marginal benefit curve MB2 is somewhat flatter 
than MB*, and must intersect IP at a positive value θ
H. Whenever the distribution of θ is 
bounded above by θ
H, the budget policy dominates the subsidy policy for MB2. But there 
exist symmetric unbounded distributions for θ such that a fixed subsidy rate is better.  
The flatter is the marginal benefit curve, the more restrictive are conditions for f(θ) such 
that a  budget policy dominates a subsidy policy. 
These results are summarized in Propositions 4 and 5. 
Proposition 4: Let t ε [1, 3). Then for all marginal benefit curves with slopes {m| -t ≤ m 
≤ -1/t} there exist values θ
L(t) = - θ
H(t) such that if θ is bounded by (θ
L(t), θ
H(t)) then a 
budget policy is the best of the three policies. Furthermore, 
(4.1)  ∂θ
H(t)/∂t < 0 and  
(4.2)  as t → 3, θ
H(t) → 0. 
Proposition 5:  For each marginal benefit curve with slope {m| -1 < m ≤ -1/3}, there 
exists a symmetric distribution f(θ) such that E(f(θ)) = 0 and a subsidy policy is better 
than a budget policy. For each marginal benefit curve with slope {m| -3 ≤ m < -1}, there 
exist symmetric distributions f(θ) such that E(f(θ)) = 0 and a quantity policy is better than 
a budget policy.
19  
These results underscore the constraint inherent in the budget policy: the budget 
represents both a ceiling and a floor.  For both very high and very low marginal cost, the 
budget policy no longer provides useful flexibility for trading off subsidy rates for 
                                                           
19 These results depend on the existence of positive interior solutions for each regulatory regime for 
sufficiently large values of θ.  
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quantities. When marginal cost is low, the marginal cost line intersects the budget curve 
in the region where the budget curve is asymptotic to the x-axis. Here, the budget policy 
acts much like the subsidy policy, although the per-unit subsidy is set lower under the 
budget policy. Because the budget policy requires that the pre-determined budget be 
spent, firms abate too much. 
 Alternatively, when the marginal cost is high, the marginal cost line intersects the 
budget curve in a region where the budget curve is asymptotic to the y-axis. Here, the 
budget policy resembles the quantity policy: spending the allocated budget leaves no 
flexibility to reduce the firm’s activity to reflect the far lower marginal benefit of 
abatement. Like the quantity policy, the budget policy results in excessive abatement. 
 
4 Optimal budget policy 
The previous sections compared three policies, keeping the expected spending by 
government constant.
20  However, if we can do better with a budget policy for the same 
expected cost, we can continue to obtain an advantage from it with a somewhat smaller 
cost. This section investigates the characteristics of the optimal size of the budget under 
the budget policy. Our proofs address the special case where the marginal benefit curve 
has slope -1; the intuition, however, suggests that the results hold more broadly.  
As Figure 1 shows, the budget curve lies above the marginal cost curve 
everywhere that θ is not zero. Thus, given any uncertainty in marginal costs, a budget 
equivalent to expected costs under the optimal subsidy policy is too large most of the 
time. Proposition 6 addresses this bias and the existence of an optimal budget. 
                                                           
20 The expected cost to the government under an optimal price policy is equivalent to expected spending to 
industry under optimal quantity regulation, although actual expenditures vary once uncertainty over the 
marginal cost curve is resolved. See Weitzman (1974).  
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Proposition 6: Let the marginal benefit curve be defined by {(q, p)| q + p = 2}; define 
the marginal cost curves by {(q, p)| q – p = θ}. Then a unique budget B* exists that 
minimizes the expected welfare loss for a budget policy, and where:  
 0  ≤ B* < 1 whenever f(θ) > 0 for some θ ≠ 0. 
Figure 1 also shows that the budget curve and the marginal benefit line diverge as 
θ moves from zero, suggesting that the optimal budget declines when “uncertainty” – 
here, the variance of the distribution of marginal cost curves - increases.  
Consider the family of probability distributions gλ(θ) = (λ)f(λθ). Let σ
2 be the 
variance of f(θ). For each λ > 0, gλ(θ) is a symmetric distribution with mean 0 and 
variance (1/λ)
2σ
2. We equate an increase in uncertainty with a decrease in λ, and consider 
how the optimal budget, B*(λ), changes with λ. 
Proposition 7. Let the marginal benefit curve be {(q, p)| q + p = 2}. Let gλ(θ) denote the 
distribution of marginal cost curves. The welfare-maximizing budget under a budget 
policy increases with  λ; thus the optimal budget B* decreases with the variance of the 
distribution of marginal costs. 
 In comparing budget policy with subsidy and quantity policies, we showed that 
for large positive or negative shocks to the marginal cost of abatement, firms abate too 
much under a budget policy when the budget is equivalent to expected costs on the other 
programs.  Another interpretation is that the budget is too high, which is established in 
these propositions for general categories of probability distributions.  In brief, for both 
very low and very high marginal costs, the budget is too high. When these outcomes 
become more probable – in, as the proposition shows, a mean-preserving spread of the 
distribution of θ - a lower budget is in order from the outset. 
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5. Conclusion 
For modestly sloped marginal benefit and marginal cost lines, a policy that relies 
on a pre-set budget may perform better than policies that rest on an ex ante establishment 
of a subsidy or quantity level.  But, while uncertainty over costs does not affect the 
relative efficiency ranking between a subsidy policy and a quantity policy, the extent of 
uncertainty over marginal costs is critical to comparing the budget policy to other 
policies.   As the marginal benefit line becomes flatter, budget policy will remain 
preferable to the quantity policy. But only when the plausible range of marginal costs is 
fairly narrow is a budget policy more attractive than a subsidy policy.  As the marginal 
line becomes steeper, budget policy similarly dominates quantity policy only for 
increasingly limited distributions over θ.   In general, greater uncertainty over costs 
narrows the set of marginal cost and marginal benefit curves for which a budget policy 
dominates either or both of the other options. 
We examined the optimal size of a budget policy, deriving two results.  First, we 
showed that budget policy can be more efficient that the alternative policies, and that the 
optimal budget is less than expected government spending under the subsidy policy.  
Second, we showed that the optimal budget declines when there is greater uncertainty 
over costs, in the specific sense of a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of 
marginal cost. The lower expected bill might offset potentially higher costs to the 
government from the requirement that a budget policy, unlike subsidy and quantity 
policy, requires ex post decisions on either the subsidy rate or the quantity. 
The result that greater uncertainty leads to a lower optimal budget is a 
consequence of our assumption that the bureau spends its entire budget. In fact, the initial 
reduction in the budget is efficient only because of the bureaucratic imperative to spend  
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all its budget, even when unjustified. Were the bureau willing to spend less than its 
program budget, or able to do so without penalty – to carry it forward to the next cycle, or 
reprogram it for a different purpose – then a superior outcome would be reached by 
allocating the identical budget as expected costs under the subsidy program.  A wise 
bureau could then adjust subsidies or quantities ex post to obtain a first-best solution.  
Indeed, we can think of the expected inefficiency of the policy – the probability weighted 
difference between the marginal benefit line and the budget constraint – as a measure of 
bureaucratic inefficiency. 
The section 4 implies that the potential attractiveness of budget regulation over 
the other instruments is broader than we conclude in section 3.  By choosing a proper 
budget – one that takes into account the agency issues involved in bureaucratic control of 
the program – the budget policy is attractive for a wider range of uncertainty than 
propositions 4 and 5 conclude.  However, for the extreme cases of perfectly inelastic and 
elastic marginal benefits, and for cases close to these extremes, the alternative 
instruments remain superior. 
Our consideration of a budget constraint can be extended to consider other 
policies.  Some governmental services are provided with a set quantity---think of 
government building public housing or a new bridge, where cost overruns will be 
covered. At other times, the government sets a price it will provide for a service, with 
demand determining the quantity provided---entitlements, as with Medicare, fit this 
approach, as does a state paying public universities a fixed amount for each student 
enrolled. And often government sets a budget, with an increase in the cost of providing 
the service met by providing a smaller quantity---maintenance of highways, parks, and so 
on meets this approach. We can then ask which approach is more efficient given  
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uncertainty about the costs of providing the service or the benefits of the service. Our 
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Appendix 
Lemma 1: For a given realization θ of the marginal cost curve, let X denote the outcome 
for a cap-and-trade system, let Y denote the outcome when government budgets, and let 
Z denote the outcome when government subsidizes. Then for the marginal benefit curve 
MBQ(θ) which bisects the line segment XY, the efficiency losses under a quantity policy 
and a subsidy policy are the same.  
Proof: 
Refer to Figure A1.  By construction, EX and YV are parallel and the line segments 
XIQ(θ) and YIQ(θ) are equal length. As a result, the EYVX must be a parallelogram and 
the identified triangles of equal size. Shifting the Marginal Benefit line towards the line q 
= Q0 yields a welfare advantage to quantity regulation over budget regulation, and vice 
versa. 
Lemma 2: Derivation of IQ and IP: 
We establish the properties of IQ; an equivalent construction holds for IP. 
The hyperbola with asymptotes q + p = 1 and q = ½ which contains the point (1, 1) is 
given by the formula: 
(A1)            IQ = (q – ½)(q + p - 1) = ½ 
By Lemma 1, it is sufficient to show that this curve bisects the line segment of p – q – θ = 
0 between the line q = 1 and the hyperbola qp = 1 for all θ. 
Consider a particular value of θ. The q-coordinate for the quantity outcome (X on Figure 
A1) must be 1, and we set the q-component for the bureaucratic outcome (Y) at 1 + w 
and that for the S, intersection of the marginal cost line and IQ, at 1 + u. It is sufficient to 
show that w = 2u. 
Let pQ, pB , pS be the p-coordinates for X, Y and S:  
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 p Q = 1 + θ 
 p B = 1 + w + θ 
 p S = 1 + u + θ 
As Y lies on the hyperbola pq = 1,  
(A2) pBqB = 1 = ((1 + w)(1 + w + θ) 
S lies on the hyperbola (q – ½)(q + p - 1) = ½. Substituting: 
  ½ = (1 + u – ½)(1 + u + 1 + u + θ - 1) = (u + ½)(2u + θ + 1) 
Thus:  
(A3)  1 = (2u + 1)(2u + θ + 1) 
Comparing (A2) and (A3) establishes that w = 2u. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
If the price and quantity regulation yield equal expected efficiency, the marginal benefit 
curve, MB*, equals {(q, p)| q + p = 2}, and has a slope of -1. As B = {(q, p)| qp = 1}, this 
line is also tangent to the curve B at point E. 
  Consider budget and quantity regulation. We show first that MB* intersects IQ 
only at θ = 0. The slope of MB* is –1; the slope of the tangent line to IQ at point E is -3.  
As IQ is a hyperbola, the slopes of the tangents to IQ increase from -∞ (at the left 
asymptote) to -1. For negative values of θ, curve IQ asymptotes to the line q+p=1, which 
is parallel to, but below, MB*. Thus, MB* and IQ cannot intersect for non-zero values of 
θ.  
 When  θ = 0, line MB* intersects IQ, and so the two regulatory methods have the same 
efficiency. For all non-zero values of θ, line MB* lies on the same side of IQ as B (refer 
to figure 2); therefore, budget regulation is more efficient than quantity regulation. 
  Similarly, MB* intersects IP only when θ = 0. For all other values of θ, line MB* lies  
 -  24  - 
between on the same side of IP as B, so that budget policy dominate a price policy.  
Proof of Proposition 2 
Consider a marginal benefit curve MB
1 that is steeper than MB*, so that its slope is less 
than -1. In this case, a quantity policy dominates a price policy. But, as discussed in the 
proof to Proposition 1, the tangencies to IP always exceed -1, so MB
1 intersects IP only 
once (at point E), and otherwise lies between IP and Q0. In this case, for all non-zero θ, 
line MB
1 is steeper than MBP(θ), and thus a budget policy dominates a price policy. 
Similarly, consider a marginal budget curve MB
2 which is flatter than MB*. Then a price 
policy dominates a quantity policy. But in this case, MB
2 must lie between IQ and P0, so 
that a budget policy dominates a quantity policy. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
It suffices to prove that quantity regulation dominates budget regulation when the slope 
of the marginal budget curve is -3, as the result then holds for any steeper marginal 
benefit curve.  By equation A1, MB
Q is tangent to I
Q at (1, 1); hence, budget regulation 
dominates quantity regulation for θ > 0 and quantity regulation dominates budget 
regulation for θ < 0.  
Let θ
H = - θ
L.    
Define the following lines, shown in Figure A2: 
The quantity regulation line: Q0 = {(q, p)| (q – 1) = 0} 
The tangent to IQ at (1, 1):  MB
Q = {(q, p)| (p – 1) + 3(q – 1) = 0} 
The tangent to B at (1, 1): MB* = {(q, p)| (p – 1) + (q – 1) = 0} 
The marginal cost line: MC(θ
L) = {(q, p)| (p – 1) – (q – 1) = θ
L} 
The marginal cost line: MC(θ
H) = {(q, p)| (p – 1) – (q – 1) = θ
H} 
And let:   
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X = the efficiency loss under quantity regulation for θ
H
Y = the efficiency loss under quantity regulation for θ
L
U = the efficiency loss under budget regulation for θ
H
V = the efficiency loss under budget regulation for θ
L
As f(θ) is symmetric, it suffices to show that (V - Y) > (X – U) 
i.  The efficiency loss under quantity regulation is identical for θ
H and θ
L. As Figure 
A3 illustrates, triangles X and Y must be similar. 
ii.  The outcomes at the intersection of the marginal cost curves and line MB*, shown 
in Figure A3 as triangle Z for θ
L and triangle W for θ
H, yield identical efficiency 
losses under quantity regulation; that is, the areas of triangles W, Z, X and Y are 
congruent. It is tedious but straightforward to show that MB
Q bisects the segment 
of MC(θ
L) between Q0 and MB*,  and that MB
Q bisects the segment of MC(θ
H) 
between Q0 and MB*.  
iii.  As MC(θ
L) and MC(θ
H) are parallel to, and equidistant from MC(0), the major 
axis of hyperbola B, the distances from MB* to B on lines MC(θ
L) and MC(θ
H) 
(labeled d and f on Figure A2) are identical. The efficiency loss under budget 
regulation for MC(θ
L) exceeds triangle Z by the additional area G, while the 
efficiency loss under budget regulation for MC(θ
H) is reduced from triangle W by 
area H. But as shown in Figure A2, H must be smaller than G. Thus: 
                     (V - Y) =  Z + G – Y > X – (W – H) =  (X – U) 
Proofs of Proposition 4 and 5 
Propositions 4 and 5 follow directly from figures 3 and 4, and the construction in 
Proposition 3.  Consider the budget-quantity comparison.  MB
Q is tangent to curve IQ at 
point E.  Any marginal benefit curve with slope between (-1) and MB
Q must intersect IQ
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for some negative value of θ. Quantity regulation then will dominate for low costs. As 
long as costs are constrained to be higher than this intersection (i.e., θ is bounded), 
budget regulation dominates. But consider a distribution for θ that places virtually all its 
weight on the extreme values of θ. In this case, Proposition 3 holds, as the advantage of 
quantity regulation over budget regulation at low marginal costs of abatement outweighs 
the advantage of budget regulation over quantity regulation at high costs. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
We first change variables to rotate the marginal benefit curve and marginal cost curves 
making them parallel the s and t axis. The same change in variables reorients the 
hyperbola perpendicular to the s-axis, so that for each θ, the distance d between the 
intersection of the marginal cost curve and hyperbola B (i.e., the outcome of budget 
regulation) and the marginal benefit curve can be easily calculated from the equation of 
the hyperbola, and the welfare loss associated with θ is ½ d
2. Let: 
  s = q – p;   t = q + p 
Note that s = θ; we use this notation in the remainder of the proofs for this section. 
Then: 
  q = (s + t)/2 and p = (t – s)/2 
  B = {(s, t)| ((s+t)/2)((t - s)/2) = B} =>  B = (t
2 – s
2)/4 
The equation for the budget constraint is given by: 




  d(s; B) = t(s; B) – t(0; 1) = (4B + s
2)
1/2 – 2 
The welfare loss associated with s and B is: 
  WL(s; B) = ½ d
2 = ½ [(4B+s
2)
1/2 – 2]
2 = ½[4B + s
2 + 4 – 4(4B + s
2)
1/2]  
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 WL(B;  λ) = ∫WL(s; B)gλ(s)ds = 2B + λ
2σ
2 + 2 - 2∫[4B + s
2]
1/2gλ(s)ds 
  ∂WL/∂B = 2 - 4∫[4B + s
2]
-1/2 gλ(s)ds  
  ∂
2WL/∂B
2 = 8∫[4B + s
2]
-1/2 gλ(s)ds > 0 
As s
2 ≥ 0, at B = 1,  
  ∂WL/∂B = 2 - 4∫[4 + s
2]
-1/2 gλ(s)ds ≥ 2 - 4∫[4]
-1/2 gλ(s)ds = 0 
where the inequality is strict whenever gλ(s) is positive for some non-zero s. 
At B = 0, ∂WL/∂B = 2 - 4∫[s
2]
-1/2 gλ(s)ds = 2 - 4∫|s|gλ(s)ds.  An interior solution is 
guaranteed as long as this expression is negative.  We consider only interior solutions in 
the subsequent analysis; however, note that for sufficiently small realizations of λ, the 
optimal budget may be at B == 0. 
Let 2 - 4∫|s|gλ(s)ds < 0.  Then we can define an optimal budget: 
(A3) B*(λ) = {B| ∫[4B + s
2]
-1/2 gλ(s)ds = ½ } 
Proof of Proposition 7. 
Differentiating (*) and rearranging: 
(A4) dB*/dλ [2 ∫[4B + s
2]
-3/2 gλ(s)ds] = ∫[4B + s
2]
-1/2 [d(gλ(s))/dλ]ds 
In (A4),dB*/dλ is multiplied by a positive factor, hence it is sufficient to show that the 
right-hand side of (A4) is positive. 
(A5) gλ(s) = λf(λs) → d(gλ(s))/dλ = f(λs) + λsf ΄(λs) 
Substituting from (A5) and (A3): 
∫[4B + s
2]
-1/2 [d(gλ(s))/dλ]ds = ∫[4B + s
2]
-1/2 f(λs)ds +  ∫[4B + s
2]
-1/2 λsf ΄(λs) 
= (1/λ)∫[4B + s
2]
-1/2 λf(λs)ds +  ∫[4B + s
2]
-1/2 λf ΄(λs) = (1/2λ) +  ∫[4B + s
2]
-1/2 λsf ΄(λs) 
We integrate by parts the final term, letting 
  u = (4B + s





 v  =  λ f ΄(λs)ds;    dv = f(λs)  
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With appropriate substitutions: 
dB*/dλ [2 ∫[4B + s
2]
-3/2 gλ(s)ds = 1/(2λ) -  ∫[4B + s
2]
-3/2 4B gλ(s)(1/λ)ds  




-1/2 4B gλ(s)(1/λ)ds 
As s
2 > 0 for all s ≠ 0,  




-1/2 4B gλ(s)(1/λ)ds >  
 1/(2λ) – (1/λ) ∫[4B]
-1[4B + s
2]
-1/2 4B gλ(s)ds = 1/(2λ) – (1/λ) ∫[4B + s
2]
-1/2gλ(s)ds 
By (A3) the final term in the preceding equation equals (1/2), so the expression is 
positive and 
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